ONE CHEER FOR THE HOSTAGE DEAL

There is jubilation in Tel Aviv over the news of an apparent cease-fire and hostage-release agreement.

There is also jubilation in Gaza and Ramallah and Tehran (where the deal was hailed as a “victory”). Even the Houthis are celebrating.   

President Biden and President-elect Trump are competing to see who can claim more credit – a competition they may live to regret.

How can so many differing and hostile elements cheer for the same arrangement? Let’s be clear. This is a horrible deal. But to paraphrase Winston Churchill’s comment on democracy, this is the worst outcome to the war in Gaza except for all the other outcomes that have been considered.

In phase one, scheduled to begin on Sunday and last 42 days, Hamas is supposed to release 33 hostages, all of them women, children, or men over 50 years old. But the terms do not distinguish between the living and the dead. Hamas holds 94 people, of whom at least 34 are thought to be dead. So it is possible that phase one will see the release of remains, not of living human beings, in which case their relatives will welcome their return with solemn burial rites, not celebrations.

Meanwhile, Israel is supposed to release some as yet unspecified number of Palestinian prisoners. According to an excerpt of the agreement obtained by the Israel Times, for each ill or wounded hostage released, Israel will release 110 Palestinians serving life sentences; meaning  murderers. For each hostage over 50 years old, Israel will release 3 Palestinian murderers and 27 Palestinians serving other sentences. On top of that, Israel will release 1,000 Gazans who were not involved in the October 7 massacre.

The deal will also lead to the release of Avera Mengistu, a mentally unstable Ethiopian-born Israeli who wandered into Gaza in 2014, and Hisham al-Sayed, an Israeli Bedouin civilian prone to auditory hallucinations who entered Gaza in 2015.  Israel will release 30 Palestinians for each of them, as well as 47 “Shalit prisoners.” The latter are Palestinians who were among the 1,027 convicted Palestinians released by Israel in 2011 in exchange for the release of one Israeli soldier, Gilad Shalit, and who were later re-arrested for committing new crimes.

If phase 1 suffers from disparity, phases 2 and 3 suffer from ambiguity. In fact, no one can describe them in any detail at all because they haven’t been drafted yet.  They are more akin to general aspirations than certain terms.

In phase 2, Hamas is supposed to release any remaining living Israeli hostages. The reports do not mention how many Palestinians Israel must release in return. Phase 3 is supposed to involve the return of all remaining dead bodies and the start of Gaza’s reconstruction supervised by Egypt, Qatar, and the United Nations.

The defects in the deal are glaring.

Other than the 33 to be released in phase 1, there is no assurance that Israel will secure the release of any hostages, dead or alive, in the vague subsequent phases. The only assurance is that Hamas will have an opportunity to replenish and rebuild its forces during the cease-fire.

The deal leaves Hamas alive and likely to retain control over Gaza. Putting Egypt, Qatar, and the United Nations in charge of reconstruction of Gaza is not just a flaw. It is idiotic. These same parties were nominally in charge of supervising reconstruction before October 7, when Hamas built its network of terror tunnels. One may assume that some, most, or perhaps all of the steel, concrete, and other construction materials expected to flood into Gaza in phase 3 will wind up in the hands of Hamas. The reconstruction will probably result in a new and improved – and more deeply embedded – Hamas subway system.

Considering the fact that this deal was negotiated when Hamas was almost mortally weakened – with its leadership eliminated, its rank and file decimated, its putative ally Hezbollah all but destroyed, and its funder Iran severely shaken – it is astonishing that it was able to obtain such favorable terms. Of course, it enjoyed the advantage of negotiating with an opponent which, unlike Hamas itself, places a supreme value on the lives of its people. Still, considering their weak hand, one must grudgingly admire the poker playing skills of the Hamas negotiators

So this is not an occasion for exclaiming: “Three cheers.” Not even two cheers are warranted. At most, one. But Israel has little choice but to accept the deal, glaring faults and all. It has a history or paying exorbitant prices to secure the return of its captive people. And the war in Gaza is the longest in its history. The spectacle of Israeli women and children, including infants, held in subhuman conditions for fifteen months has seared its soul. The country is spiritually exhausted.

Still, there are measures Israel may take to make this horrible deal more bearable.

First, there is a score to settle with Iran, the primary sponsor and funder of Hamas. Iran had advance notice of the October 7 attack, which could never have happened without its financial and material assistance. Hamas, like Hezbollah and the Houthis, is an Iranian proxy. All these proxies have been damaged. But Iran has largely escaped. So far.

When the last of the hostages has returned, Israel should act. Destruction of Iran’s nuclear facilities would be an appropriate punishment, but such a move may not be feasible without U.S. involvement. Destruction of Iran’s oil export facilities would be a second-best option. At minimum, such a measure would be a body blow to Iran’s economy, limiting if not ending its ability to fund its terror proxies. At most, it might destabilize the regime, leading to its downfall.

Second, Israel should ensure that during the reconstruction of Gaza, not a single bag of concrete mix and not a single steel beam falls into the hands of Hamas. Egypt, Qatar, and the UN cannot be trusted to do so. This should not require maintaining an IDF presence in Gaza. Israel’s intelligence resources should be able to monitor the disposition of such misdirected materials. And Israel’s air force should be able to destroy any sites containing them.

Third, and finally, Israel should remember that under universally accepted legal and moral principles, an agreement made under duress is invalid. One may make any number of promises to a felon holding a gun to one’s head. As soon as the gun is removed, those promises are unenforceable.

The time will come when the men, women, and children who have suffered through unspeakable captivity are free. When that time comes, whether it be long or short, Israel should also consider itself free.  Free to inflict the punishment the despicable captors and their abettors deserve.